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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between retirement and wealth.  In a simple model 
where the only heterogeneity is in leisure preference, other things the same, those who retire 
early accumulate more wealth while still working, enabling them to support themselves over 
their longer retirement period.  Moreover, characteristics that encourage earlier retirement also 
encourage additional saving.  If there were heterogeneity in both leisure and time preference, 
however, this simple relation is broken.  Early retirees do not necessarily save more. 
Using data from the first four waves of the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study, a 
cohort of individuals born from 1931 to 1941, we estimate reduced form retirement and wealth 
equations.  Linked employer provided pension plan descriptions and social security 
administrative records are central to the analysis. The value of the pension and social security 
beyond current period accrual is measured by the difference between the present value of the 
benefit stream resulting from additional work until the date of retirement and the present value of 
a stream of benefits equal each year to the value of benefit accrual in the initial period.  This 
measure, which we call the premium value, captures any excess value from the spikes at early 
and normal retirement age in a defined benefit plan.  But it also has zero value in the case of a 
defined contribution plan. 
Calculating benefit increments on the assumption that benefits are claimed as soon as 
eligible after retiring, and that respondents link delayed benefit claiming with delayed retirement, 
the estimated retirement equation indicates that a higher future reward from pensions and social 
security encourages postponed retirement.   
Factors leading to early retirement do not systematically generate higher saving.  Many 
independent variables do not have symmetric effects in the retirement and wealth equations. 
Unobservables from the retirement and wealth equations are only weakly correlated. A related 
finding, not easily reconciled with a simple life cycle model of saving, is that higher pension 
wealth and social security wealth do not substitute for other forms of wealth, but add to total 
wealth.  In addition, other findings support a more complicated view of the underlying behavior. 
Most importantly, despite a significant payoff to waiting, retirees do not time the acceptance of 
their social security benefits so as to maximize expected value.  Most respondents take their 
social security benefits as soon as eligible after retirement. This raises questions about the way 
social security and pensions are calculated as explanatory variables in reduced form retirement 
equations. 
These and other findings, e.g., on measuring retirement and on the role of partial 
retirement, raise doubts about the value of using reduced form retirement equations to estimate 
the effects of changing such social security policies as the early retirement age.  Reduced form 
retirement equations must be used with great caution in situations where they are analyzing new 
policy initiatives.  Unobserved heterogeneity interacts with observable variables to produce the 
estimated coefficients in these equations, but these interactions are not necessarily the same if the 
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I.  Introduction. 
This paper presents a reduced form analysis of retirement and wealth accumulation for 
members of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of a nationally 
representative sample of the population who was 51 to 61 years old in 1992. We use the first four 
waves of the survey. 
To predict the effects of important changes in social security and related policies on 
retirement and saving outcomes, one must have confidence in the specification of the retirement 
and saving equations that are used to project behavior.  It is particularly important to understand 
how the relationship between retirement and saving outcomes are determined, and to ensure that 
critical dimensions of behavior and tastes have not been omitted so as to bias coefficients on 
variables used to project the effects of social security and pension programs on retirement and 
saving. 
This paper attempts to enhance our understanding of the behavior underlying the 
retirement and saving decisions, and the relationship between these decisions. We start by 
reviewing what has been learned about retirement and saving behavior from the literature.  We 
then put these findings into perspective by considering how retirement and saving decisions are 
linked in a simple life cycle model, where the principal heterogeneity is in preferences for 
leisure.  In that framework, a person who intends to retire earlier accumulates more wealth at 
each age until retirement than a person with a weaker preference for leisure.  We also consider 
how the relation between the parameters in the retirement and wealth equations may be affected 
by more complex forms of heterogeneity, e.g., independent or correlated distributions of the 
preference for leisure and time preference. Next we estimate reduced form equations for 
retirement and wealth.  A reduced form model allows us to examine the patterns among the 
coefficients of the exogenous variables in the retirement and wealth equations and the 
relationships among the residuals, to see if a simple life cycle model with heterogeneity in leisure 
preferences is adequate to explain the relationship between saving and retirement.  
Measures of the accrual in pension and social security values with continued employment 
play a central role in any study of the relation of pensions and social security to retirement and 
saving behavior.  In the present paper, we measure these incentives by the immediate per period 









of the potential future benefits, including spikes in benefit accrual at early and normal retirement 
ages, and the value from the basic accrual in each period.  Thus the measure of the future value is 
positive in a defined benefit plan with a sharp spike in the accrual profile at early retirement age, 
but has no value for a defined contribution plan with benefits that accrue evenly each period. 
We show that when social security incentives are computed on the assumption that 
respondents accept benefits immediately upon retiring, the calculated incentives to retire are 
much sharper than when the date of benefit acceptance is timed to maximize the present value of 
benefits. If they are constrained to claim benefits immediately, due say to liquidity constraints, 
then the reward to postponing retirement, i.e., continuing to work, includes the value from 
postponing benefit receipt.  Most of those entering retirement in fact claim their benefits 
immediately upon retiring. This raises a question about whether liquidity constraints or other 
complexities not reflected in a simple retirement model act to enhance the rewards to immediate 
retirement, or whether the decision to claim benefits is independent of the decision to retire.  The 
related question is whether the reward to postponed retirement should include the accrual in 
benefit value from delayed benefit receipt. 
Other evidence from previous studies also suggests it may be necessary to modify 
assumptions about perfectly operating capital markets, full-information and understanding of the 
social security system by all covered workers, equal valuation of own and spouse benefits, and 
other key assumptions typically made in modeling retirement and saving behavior.  There also 
are related puzzles.  Pensions do not bear a simple relation to nonpension saving, as they would 
if pensions were treated simply as a tax favored retirement saving device.  Rather, although some 
of those with pensions reduce their nonpension saving, they reduce nonpension saving by much 
less than the value of their pension. 
An advantage of using a reduced form approach to estimate separate retirement and 
saving equations is that it does not constrain the coefficients to be consistent with a simple life 
cycle specification.  Rather, a reduced form approach allows the data to freely tell how 
retirement and wealth accumulation are related to social security and pension increments from 
postponing retirement.  These findings help us to understand the behavior underlying the 
retirement and saving decisions, without constraining the analysis at a very early stage.  Once we 




             
   
 
 





saving, we are in a better position to estimate a structural model that will be more useful for 
analyzing how retirement policies shape retirement outcomes and saving behavior, and how 
changes in policies will affect retirement and saving.  
Incentives created by social security and pensions are measured using linked data. 
Earnings histories for work through 1991 have been obtained from the Social Security 
Administration, for respondents who signed permission forms allowing their earnings records to 
be used. Detailed descriptions of pension plan provisions have been obtained from the employers 
of respondents who indicated they were covered by a pension on present or past jobs. 
. 
II.  What Previous Studies Indicate About Underlying Behavior 
Studies of retirement and saving typically are conducted independently of each other, and 
at times involve inconsistent assumptions. Most studies of saving take retirement behavior to be 
fixed.  At best the retirement horizon or expected retirement date is included as a right hand side 
variable.
1   Studies of retirement typically assume that capital markets are perfect, so that saving 
and consumption decisions are made in the background, and do not affect the retirement 
decision.
2  Nevertheless, previous studies of retirement and saving contain a great deal of 
information that will help us to understand the relation between retirement and saving behavior. 
Studies of retirement recognize that pension and social security benefit formulas affect 
the reward to continued work, and incorporate these incentives.
3  The saving literature is only 
now evolving to fully incorporate the influence of pensions and social security on saving.  
Although social security and pensions represent half the wealth accumulated for retirement 
(Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier, 1999), many studies of saving ignore pension and 
1See Gustman and Juster (1996) for a discussion of inconsistencies between the saving, 
retirement and pension literatures.  In the present paper we control for some factors correlated 
with precautionary and bequest motives, but do not explore these motivations systematically.  
We also do not consider behavioral reactions to uncertain lifetimes, annuities, the demand for life 
insurance, and related issues. 
2Rust and Phalen (1997) is an exception.  They assume that the capital market is not 
operative so that the retirement decision affects the path of consumption.   
3See Lumsdaine (1996) and Lumsdaine and Mitchell (forthcoming) for recent summaries 
3  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
social security wealth.  Moreover, it is not just a question of whether pensions and social security 
are accounted for when analyzing saving.  Even when pensions are counted as part of wealth, 
fundamental questions remain.  Those with pensions accumulate more total wealth that those 
without pensions, holding lifetime income and the retirement horizon constant (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 1999a).  Thus pensions promote retirement saving.
4  Indeed, there is very little 
reduction in other wealth to compensate for higher pension values.  As a result, a wealth equation 
cannot treat pensions simply as a tax favored method of saving that is a substitute for other forms 
of saving. 
Considerable progress has been made in measuring the future value promised by a 
pension or social security, and in using these measures to explain retirement or job mobility.  
Lazear and Moore (1988) and Stock and Wise (1990a and b) dub the potential value of the 
pension resulting from continued work at the firm for a number of years in the future, the “option 
value” of the pension.  A related measure is the difference between the projected liability and the 
legal liability of the pension, that is the value of a defined benefit plan that accrues from future 
expected employment, but is not legally owed to the worker based on employment to date.  This 
measure is used by Ippolito (1986) to evaluate the implicit pension contract.  Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1993, 1995) use a measure of pension backloading to estimate the disincentive to 
mobility from pensions.  Coile and Gruber (1999a and b) adopt a measure they call the peak 
value, which is the maximum found for all future dates of retirement, and use it to evaluate 
retirement incentives from social security.   
In a reduced form setting, the challenge is to properly value current and future benefits, 
especially the spikes in the pension accrual profile seen at the early and normal retirement dates.  
Yet one will downplay the relative importance of the spikes in the benefit accrual profile at early 
and retirement age by simply add up the expected future benefit for each year of future 
employment.  That is, when benefits are simply summed, a defined contribution plan will have a 
misleadingly large future value.  Below we will blend available measures for valuing future 
of retirement research.   
4Those with pensions may be more aware of the need for retirement savings, and save 
more as a result.  Also consistent with this view, Lusardi (1999) finds that those who plan for 





   




benefits, basing our evaluation of the expected future value of the pension or social security on 
what we will call the “premium value”, which we measure as the difference between the present 
value of the future benefit stream and the present value of a stream of benefits equal each year to 
the value of the basic level of accrual initially observed for the plan.  The “premium value” 
differs from “peak value” used by Coile and Gruber (1999 a and b) in that the peak value counts 
all increases in benefits with continued work, and thus peak value continues to increase in time 
as benefits are accumulated in defined contribution plans, while the premium value does not. 
A number of findings from the literature raise questions about the behavior governing 
retirement and saving decisions.  People are not very well informed about the details of their 
pensions.  Many cannot identify what type of pension they have, which is a particular problem 
for studies that would attempt to estimate retirement incentives from pensions using respondent 
surveys (Mitchell, 1988, Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989 and 1999b).  Respondents are especially 
poorly informed about the location and size of the spikes in pension benefit accruals created by 
their defined benefit plans, which are key determinants of the incentives that pensions create for 
retirement behavior (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999b).  Imperfect information about pensions 
leads to two kinds of problems.  One is that descriptions of pensions (or social security) obtained 
from respondents may be misleading.  This problem can be remedied by using linked pension 
and social security data obtained from employers and from the Social Security Administration.
5 
A second problem is that the respondents may be guided in their saving or retirement decisions 
by a misunderstanding of their pensions.  This second problem cannot be fixed through the use 
of better data, but must be modeled. 
There also are questions about the behavior that determines when people claim their 
social security benefits.  There is a literature analyzing when it is optimal to claim benefits.
6 
5Matched employer pension plan descriptions are available for use with the Survey of 
Consumer Finances of 1983 and 1989, the National Longitudinal Study of Mature Women, and 
with the Health and Retirement Study. 
6Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1980) and Clark and Gohman (1983) have discussed the 
actuarial advantage of delayed claiming of social security benefits.  See also Feldstein and 
Samwick (1992).  Coile, Diamond, Gruber and Jousten (1999) also suggest that it is optimal for 








From an expected value perspective, it is often optimal not to claim benefits when first eligible, 
but to delay claiming benefits so as to disproportionately increase the value of benefits, 
especially of spouse and survivor benefits.
7  Models of retirement and saving should be 
reconciled with observed claiming behavior.   
There are a number of reasons why social security beneficiaries may not delay their 
acceptance of benefits to the optimal time.  One possibility is that the primary beneficiary places 
less weight on spouse and survivor benefits than on own benefits.
8  If a primary earner places a 
lower weight on spouse and survivor benefits than on own benefits, we can expect to observe 
earlier claiming by the primary beneficiary.  Another possibility is that liquidity constraints are 
important, because, perhaps, some are over-annuitized.  A household with little liquid wealth 
will not be able to support consumption between retirement and the time of first receipt of 
delayed benefits.  Or perhaps the answer is correlated leisure and time preferences. 
It is important to understand claiming behavior in order to properly measure how social 
security affects the incentive to retire.  If people claim their social security benefits so as to 
maximize expected value, we show below that the reward to postponing benefit claiming will be 
reduced.  Even if benefits are claimed immediately upon retirement, as the evidence suggests in 
most cases it is, retirement and claiming behavior may not be tied in the respondent’s mind.  
Accordingly, retirement decisions may not be influenced by the actuarial increase in the value of 
social security benefits from delayed claiming.  Still another possibility is that individuals may 
a few delay claiming their benefits, and counter to expectations based on a lower expected value, 
that single men are more likely to delay claiming their benefits than are married men.  
7Actuarial returns to social security vary with family status and age, and may be quite 
generous at younger ages.  Using the social security benefit reduction rate on the assumption of 
normal retirement at age 65, at age 62 a 6.67 percent increase in benefits from delaying 
retirement for one year raises the benefit by 6.67/.8, or 8.33 percent.  Given the life tables, that 
adjustment is better than actuarially fair, at least it is if one’s spouse is not over the age of 65.  
8The purpose of the Pension Equity Act is to protect spouses from circumstances where 
the primary earner takes a single life annuity and leaves the spouse with no pension income once 
he dies.  For an analogous reason, even though Congress has just abolished the earnings test for 
those over 65, Congress refused to abolish the social security earnings test for those between the 
ages of 62 and 65.  See Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) for an analysis of social security 





   
 
 
       
 
                                                 
 
 
be sophisticated enough to understand the actuarial return to postponing benefits, but not 
sophisticated enough to divorce the decision to retire from the decision to accept benefits. Thus 
whether social security creates incentives that influence retirement outcomes depends on 
claiming behavior, and the valuation of deferred social security benefits in turn depend on the 
reason why most retirees do not defer their benefit claims.   
When it comes to those who are working part time and are earning enough to be subject 
to the earnings test, more are willing to postpone benefit acceptance.
9  A person who is working 
part time and making more than the earnings test disregard is in roughly the same actuarial 
position with regard to the lost earnings as a person who postpones benefit receipt.  Both will 
have their future benefits increased by a similar amount to cover their lost benefits. 
We are aware of a number of other issues affecting the specification of retirement and 
saving equations.  Findings are sensitive to how retirement is measured, based on self reported 
status, hours of work, or some combination (Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier, 1995; Gustman 
and Steinmeier, 2000).  Findings will also be influenced by whether the partially retired are 
counted as retired or not retired (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984).  We address these issues 
below. 
III.  Joint Determination of Retirement and Wealth in a Simple Model 
To facilitate the discussion of the relationship between retirement and wealth, let us 
examine a simple yet instructive model.  In this model, the consumer maximizes a lifetime utility 
function: 
T  ρ U  =  e
 -t  u[C(t)] dt      ∫0
subject to a lifetime budget constraint 
9Many of those who continue to work have the option of immediately claiming some of 
the their benefits, with the remainder postponed due to the earnings test.  Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1991, p. 742) found, using 1984 data from the Continuous Work History Survey, 
that only 30 to 40 percent of working individuals who are eligible for partial benefits at age 62 
register for them. 
7  















 C(t) dt   =  WR ∫0
where  C(t)  is consumption at time  t,  W  is the (constant) wage rate,  R  is the retirement age, 
and T is the lifetime.
10  The Euler-Lagrange condition for this problem is 
       
  U  [C(t)]   ′ =  λ e 
ρt 
where  8  is a Lagrangian multiplier which, in this problem, is constant over time.  





U′′ [C(t)]   =  e 
ρt 
∂ R  ∂ R
Since  UΟ < 0,  this condition implies that  ΜC/ΜR  and  Μ8/ΜR  are of opposite signs, and 
furthermore, since  8  is constant over time, that the sign of  ΜC/ΜR  is uniform over time. 
Differentiating the budget constraint with respect to R gives 
   
T  ∂ C
 dt  =  W  >  0 ∫0 ∂ R
Since  ΜC/ΜR  has a uniform sign over time, that sign must be positive.  Assets at any point in 
time before retirement are simply the difference between the cumulative wages and the 
cumulative consumption: 
    A(t)   =  Wt  - ∫ 
t 
′  C(t ) dt′ 
0
Since an increase in the retirement age uniformly increases consumption over time, it must 
10 Inserting a real interest rate into the budget constraint and/or allowing wages to grow 
over time makes the algebra more cluttered but does not affect any of the conclusions regarding 
the model. 
8  












reduce the level of assets at any point in time:   ΜA/ΜR < 0. 
Implications of Heterogeneous Leisure Preferences. 
Suppose that different individuals have characteristics (either observed or unobserved) 
that make them either more or less inclined to retire early.  Let  Xi  be one such characteristic, 
one such that high values of  Xi  are associated with earlier retirement:  ΜR/ΜXi  <  0.  We can 
also ask what the effect of  Xi  is on asset holdings at some time prior to retirement.  Since  Xi 
operates indirectly through the retirement age in the model above, and not directly on either 
assets or consumption,   ΜA(t)/ΜXi  =  ΜA(t)/ΜR  ΜR/ΜXi  <  0.  Holding all other things 
equal, a characteristic that makes an individual more inclined to retire early also induces that 
individual to hold more assets than otherwise. 
A simple interpretation of this is that if the individual plans to retire early, he or she will 
hold more pre-retirement assets in order to finance the longer period of retirement without a 
sharp cutback on consumption.  This finding is noted in the top part of Table 1.  There, an earlier 
retirement is associated with an increased level of assets at any pre-retirement age. 
Implications of Heterogeneous Time Preference. 
Next, let us investigate the effects of heterogeneous time preference, holding leisure 
preferences (and hence the retirement date) constant.  Without going through the details of the 
derivation in the model above, it can be shown that   ΜA(t)/Μ∆  <  0.  Heuristically, an increase 
in time preference is associated in the consumption formula with a more rapid decline in 
consumption over the lifetime, and hence with a tendency to consume more in the early years.  
Increased consumption in the early years will lower the amount of accumulated savings with a 
given level of wages. 
The second part of Table 1 indicates these results.  A higher level of time preference will 
have no effect on the retirement age, given that we are assuming here that leisure preferences are 
constant.  However, the higher level of time preference will result in lower rates of asset 
accumulation and lower levels of assets at any given age. 
Correlated Leisure Preferences and Time Preferences. 
The previous few paragraphs have examined either heterogeneous leisure preferences, 







constant.  If the two sets of preferences were independent, then the correlation between early 
retirement and higher wealth levels that are implied from the first panel in Table 1 would prevail 
overall.  That is, an individual with high leisure preferences would be more likely to retire early 
and hold more wealth.  Because there is no systematic correlation with leisure preferences, 
heterogeneous time preference does not change this relationship, although it does spread out the 
wealth distribution for a given leisure preference.  The net result is that allowing for both 
preferences but requiring that they be independent implies that there is still a positive association 
between early retirement and wealth holdings, but they are not as tightly correlated as when we 
considered heterogeneous leisure with a given time preference. 
However, there is no particular reason to assume that leisure preferences and time 
preferences are uncorrelated, and arguments for a correlation are relatively easy to make.  A high 
time preference is symptomatic of an increased desire for short term gratification, the “I want it 
now” attitude.  The same desire for short term gratification is likely to carry over into the 
leisure/work decision, where it manifests itself as an increased desire for leisure.  Thus, it is 
plausible to argue for a positive correlation between time preference and leisure preference. 
The lower panel of Table 1 gives the results of combining heterogeneous leisure 
preferences with positively associated heterogeneous time preferences.  For an individual with 
high leisure preferences, retirement is more likely to occur early.  Because of the longer 
retirement period, there is an incentive to have higher levels of wealth in the years leading up to 
retirement.  However, offsetting this is the fact that such an individual is likely to have high 
levels of time preference as well.  High levels of time preference work in the opposite direction 
in terms of wealth accumulation and tend to lower the level of wealth.  Which effect is dominant 
is a priori unclear; hence the wealth of individuals with high leisure preferences is labeled as 
“ambiguous.”  The net result is that in this situation early retirement may be associated with 
either high or low levels of wealth, and the direction of the correlation between retirement and 
wealth is not determined. 
Implications. 
One of the purposes of this study is to find out what kinds of models are generally 
consistent with the data.  Models which allow for individual heterogeneity in the preferences for 




   




                                                 
 
 
relationship between retirement ages and wealth levels.  If this relationship is supported by the 
data, then it would be appropriate to estimate structural versions of this model.  However, if the 
data do not contain evidence of this relationship, then the simple model will not suffice.  
Fortunately, a slightly more general version of this model, which includes both heterogeneous 
leisure preferences and heterogeneous time preferences and allows for these preferences to be 
correlated in plausible ways, can accommodate cases where retirement ages and wealth levels are 
not correlated, or are positively correlated.  If this turns out to be the case, structural estimation 
should concentrate on these or similar models. 
IV.  Data and Variables. 
The data used to investigate the relationship between retirement and wealth come from 
the first four waves of the original cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).   The HRS 
began in 1992 with about 9,800 respondents who were born between 1931 and 1941.  Spouses 
were also interviewed, but unless they were born in this time period they are not included in this 
study, since they are not representative of their respective cohorts.  The study continued to 
interview the respondents at two year intervals, and the current study uses these interviews 
through 1998, which is the last interview available. 
Defining Retirement: 
One of the focuses of the study is retirement, which in the empirical analysis we will take 
to be the transition from working in one survey year to being retired in the next.  Measures of 
retirement as of the survey date are probably more precise and do not require us to infer exactly 
when between two surveys an individual actually retired.  To implement this retirement 
definition, however, we must define exactly what it means to be working and what it means to be 
retired.  There are several potential ways to measure retirement in the HRS, but these group into 
objective based measures, such as whether you have a job in the survey week, and subjective 
measures, such as whether on not you consider yourself to be retired. 
These measures are not always consistent.  Table 2 gives cross-tabulations of two 
measures: usual hours per week and self reported retirement.
11  The percentages along the 
11For self reported retirement, there is a not applicable category, which applies to 
11  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
diagonal are instances where the two measures agree, and these total to about 83.4% of the 
observations.  For the remaining observations, which are about one-sixth of the total, there is 
disagreement between the objective measure and the self-reported retirement status. 
Looking first above the diagonal, these are cases where the respondent is working more 
than would be expected with the self-reported retirement status.  Since the respondent is 
working, it is probably not appropriate to classify him or her as completely retired.  On the other 
hand, an examination of numerous individual records suggests that if the respondent responds 
that he or she is partially or fully retired, there is usually a reason for the response even if the 
current hours are in the full-time range.  Perhaps the respondent has worked for 60 hours per 
week in previous jobs and is now only working 40 hours a week, or sometimes there is a 
noticeable drop in earnings, suggesting an easier job.  Frequently the work history contains a 
change of employer around the date the respondent says he or she partially or fully retired.  In 
any case, it appears to be sensible to treat respondents who are working but say they are partially 
or completely retired as though they are partially retired, since in most cases there is at least 
some evidence they are not working as hard as they did at one time. 
Below the diagonal are respondents who claim to be working more than the objective 
measures suggest.  One cell contains respondents who claim to be not retired at all even though 
their usual hours per week at their present job are below 35.  To decide whether such individuals 
are not retired or partially retired, we look at previous jobs in the job history.  If there were 
previous jobs with 35 hours of work or more, then there is evidence of a reduction of work effort, 
and the individuals are classified as partially retired.  If there is no evidence of previous jobs with 
35 or more hours per week, then there is no evidence of lower work effort, and the respondents 
claims that they are not retired at all are accepted.  For the respondents who claim to be not 
retired or partially retired but who did not have current jobs, we look to see whether they also 
claim to be unemployed and how long ago their last job was.  If they say they are unemployed 
but had a job within the previous twelve months, their self reported status is accepted.  But for 
the remainder of the respondents, who are the large majority of this group, the claim of not being 
retired is not accepted, and they are classified as being completely retired. 
homemakers and respondents who have not worked for years.  Such responses were included in 





                                                 
 
 
In short, we are making a new definition of retirement status based both on objective 
hours and subjective self reports.  By themselves, both self reports and objective hours have 
problems.  Hours measures have problems with individuals who reduce work effort while still 
being above 35 hours and with individuals who have always worked less than 35 hours.  Self 
reports appear to be unreliable both in cases where the individuals have jobs yet say they are 
completely retired and with individuals who do not have jobs yet claim to be not retired.  The 
hybrid measure of retirement that we are using should ameliorate these deficiencies. 
Measuring Wealth. 
The second focus of the study is on wealth.  The HRS went to a lot of trouble to gather 
good wealth numbers, including trying to bracket amounts for which the respondents were 
unable to provide exact numbers.  This both reduces the need for imputation and probably 
increases the accuracy of the imputations that are made, increasing the accuracy of the wealth 
measures. The main problem in wealth regressions is one of scale.  If wealth is entered in a linear 
format as a dependent variable, the wealth regressions are likely to be dominated by those with 
high levels of wealth.  If instead wealth is entered in a logarithmic format, there is the problem of 
what to do with those with zero or negative wealth numbers.  These problems can be avoided by 
using as the dependent variable the level of wealth as a percentage of potential wealth, which can 
be measured as the real value of lifetime household earnings.  Lifetime earnings, in turn, can be 
measured fairly accurately from the social security earnings records which were collected as part 
of the survey.  These records can be corrected for instances where earnings are masked by the 
social security earnings maximum or where earnings were not recorded because the respondent 
was in a non-covered job.  The resulting dependent variable, which should lie between zero and 
one, should not be severely affected by scale.  Roughly speaking, this approach treats a 
household that has $100,000 in assets out of $2,000,000 in lifetime earnings as in roughly the 
same situation as a household that has $25,000 in assets out of $500,000 in lifetime earnings.
12 
12One can expect a nonlinear relationship between wealth and lifetime earnings on both 
the low and high ends of the income and wealth distributions.  Those with low earnings and 
wealth are insured against adverse events by a variety of government income and wealth tested 
programs that are not available to those with higher wealth or income (Hubbard, Skinner and 






                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
Most of the explanatory variables in this study are fairly straightforward, and the 
Appendix table lists a short description of each variable.  There are a few variables which merit a 
few words of additional discussion, however.  The most important group of these relate to the 
incentives that pensions and social security provide either to keep on working or to retire.  The 
first two of these variables measure the increases in future pension and social security benefits 
that come with continued work.  These are usually called the pension and social security 
accruals.  Since we are looking at the probability of retiring in the period between one survey and 
the next, there are really two accruals that are important.  The first accrual, which we will call the 
beginning accrual, is measured as of the beginning of the period.  For instance, if the respondent 
is 57 years and 5 months old at the beginning of the period, the beginning pension accrual would 
be the value of the pension if the respondent were to retire on his/her 58
th birthday less the value 
if the retirement were on the 57
th birthday.  A large accrual at this date probably induces some 
individuals to delay retirement until after the beginning of the period, so they can collect the 
accrual.  This should have a positive effect on retirement if subsequent accruals are less.  The 
second accrual, which we will call the final accrual, is measured as of the end of the period.  If 
this accrual is high, then respondents will probably delay retirement until after the date of the 
second interview, pushing down retirement rates.
13 
As discussed above, the additional benefits to be accrued as a result of continued 
employment into future years can also have incentives for retirement that are not necessarily 
captured by the accruals at either the start nor the end of the period over which we are measuring 
retirement.  An example would be a pension which increases sharply in value a couple of years 
after the end of the second survey.  In this case, a respondent might delay retirement not because 
the current accruals are high, but because of the prospect of the higher pensions if he or she waits 
until the sharp increase in value.  This idea is called “option value” by Stock and Wise (1990a 
and b) and “peak value” by Coile and Gruber (1999a and b).  However, neither of these measures 
different between those at the upper end of the income and wealth distributions and those who 
have less income and wealth. 
13There may also be an interaction between the accrual at the beginning and end of the 
period since one would expect the impact of the accrual to depend on how it compares to the 






                                                                                                                                                             
 
quite embraces the idea that we are trying to capture, which is the potential of a future extra 
bonus on top of any current accruals.  For instance, both the option value and the peak value 
would increase more or less indefinitely for defined contribution plans, and yet these plans in 
general are not perceived to provide a strong incentive to retire at any particular time. 
For this reason we are introducing a new measure of future incentives which we call the 
“premium value.”  To calculate this measure, for each future year we calculate the value of the 
pension and compare it to the value the pension would have if the current accruals were to 
continue until the future year.  The premium value is simply the maximum of the present value 
of these differences.  For instance, using constant dollars, suppose that a pension were worth 
$100,000 if the individual retired now, $105,000 if retirement were next year, $112,000 if 
retirement were in two years,  $150,000 if retirement were in three years, and $155,000 if 
retirement were in four years.  The jump in value three years from now is not uncommon in 
defined benefit plans and is called the “pension spike” in some of our previous work. 
The current accrual rate is $5,000 (the difference between $105,000 and $100,000), 
which represents the increase in pension value from working the current year.  The current 
accrual rate does not reflect the large increase three years later, however.  The calculations for 
the premium value are maximized at the three year mark.  In three years, the value of the pension 
at the current accrual rates would be $115,000, which is the original $100,000 plus three years of 
$5,000 accruals.  The actual value of the pension would be $150,000.  The difference of $35,000 
is the premium value and represents the information about the future value of the pension beyond 
what is implied in the current accrual rate.  Note that in this example the pension is not 
necessarily maximized in the third year; further increases would be possible without affecting the 
premium value as long as those increases are not larger than the current accrual rate.  Note also 
that a defined contribution plan which increases steadily in value will have a zero premium 
value, since there are no future benefits in this type of plan that are not evident in the current 
accrual rate.  Social security benefits can also have these premium values if the benefit increases 
for delaying benefits are more than actuarially fair.  Such is frequently the case for married 
respondents whose spouses will be collecting benefits based on the respondents’ earnings. 
Table 3 gives the distributions of accruals and premium values for both social security 






and pensions for respondents who are considered to be not retired.  For the premiums, the last 
section of the table details the amounts for the respondents who have non-zero values.  The 
premium value is measured at the end of the period, because it is presumably the premium at this 
time which would induce respondents to delay retirement.  Both the accruals and premium 
values are expressed as a percentage of the current earnings.  Presumably the incentives from 
pensions and social security to continue working are more related to the percentage by which 
they increase the regular earnings than they are to the absolute values of the amounts. 
Pension and social security accruals each average around 6-8% of current earnings, but 
the variation in pension accruals is almost twice as much as for social security accruals.  This is 
important because if the estimated effects are the same, the differential impact of the accruals on 
retirement behavior for the respondents is related to the variance of the accruals and not 
necessarily to the mean.  With regard to the premium values, when averaged across the whole 
population, the premium is actually higher for social security than for pensions, at 18% vs 11%, 
but again the variation in premium values for pensions is somewhat greater than for social 
security.  Part of this comes from the fact that over four times as many respondents have social 
security premium values as have pension premium values.  If we just look at respondents with 
positive premium values, both the mean and variation of the pension premium values are much 
higher than for the social security premium values. 
The final data issue is the derivation of the sample to be analyzed from the observations 
in the data set.  This information is reported in Table 4.  The HRS interviewed 12,652 
respondents in the initial wave in 1992, and by 1998 the survey had conducted almost 45,000 
interviews with these individuals.  However, only the respondents born between 1931 and 1941 
are a representative sample, and imposing this restriction eliminates about a quarter of the 
interviews.  We require that the individual initially be not retired, i.e., working full time; this 
leaves about 18,000 observations.  We require usable age and earnings figures, and if the 
respondent is married, that the spouse is also interviewed so as to be able to compute household 
earnings variables.  Finally, we require that if the individual reports a pension on the current job, 
the pension be included in the employer-provided pension provider file.  We make this last 
requirement because the respondent interview provides a very poor basis for imputing pension 











imposed, we are left with about 11,700 observations. 
Since retirement is defined as a change in status between one wave and the next, we must 
consider periods in which the respondents were interviewed in two adjacent waves. Dropping 
interviews for which there was no subsequent interview leaves about 8,900.  There are a couple 
of minor additional deletions because either the work status or age is not available in the final 
wave, so that the final number of observations used in the retirement part of the analysis is about 
8,600.  For the wealth regressions, there are some additional deletions.  First, it would seem 
inappropriate to use the same regression for both married respondents and single respondents.  
Among the single respondents, there are problems with divorced and widowed respondents 
because the survey does not interview the former spouses, and hence we cannot tell the earnings 
potential of the household.  The sample of the remaining single respondents, who are the never 
married group, is small enough that the results are questionable.  Therefore, we only look at 
married respondents in wealth regressions.  This brings the sample down to about 6,300.  We 
further delete anyone in a household which reports any substantial inheritance (more than 
$10,000), or if the total wealth including pensions and social security exceeds the real value of 
the earnings for that household.  This leaves around 5,600 observations for the wealth 
regressions. 
V.  Retirement and Wealth Regressions. 
In this section we look at the results of the retirement and wealth regressions.  Table 5 
presents the principal results.  The retirement regression is actually a probit equation, and the 
figures reported in the table are the marginal effects, that is, the change in probability of 
retirement that results from a one unit change in the independent variable. 
First consider the retirement probit.  The dependent variable in this probit is whether or 
not a respondent who was fully working in the initial survey had completely retired by the 
second survey, where retirement is as defined in the previous section.  The overall probability of 
retirement between one survey year and the next is about 13.6%, so that numbers such as 0.06 or 
0.07, while they may appear small, actually represent an increase in retirement rates of about 50 
percent.  In the retirement equation, the combined pension and social security incentive variables 





                                                 
 
 
effects to be approximately equal and of opposite sign, whereas the effect of the final accrual is 
almost twice as large.  However, the difference is not significant using a likelihood ratio test. 
These coefficients suggest that moving from an accrual value which is one standard deviation 
below the mean to one which is one standard deviation above the mean (see Table 3) changes 
retirement by around 3 percentage points, or by roughly one-quarter.  A similar variation in the 
premium value would also change retirement by 2-3 percentage points.
14 
The age variables follow the expected path in that the retirement probability steadily 
increases at higher ages.  There is almost no evidence of a pure age effect at age 65, although 
there is a considerable effect at age 62.  Recall that age is measured at the beginning of the 
period and that the period is roughly two years, so respondents aged 60 or 61 at the beginning of 
the period will have passed 62 by the end of the period.  Thus, the increases in the coefficients at 
ages 60 and 61 probably reflect a spike when individuals turn 62.  The cause of this spike is still 
under debate.  It could reflect liquidity constraints that are relaxed when the individual is able to 
collect social security benefits, or it could be that individuals do not value (or are not aware of) 
higher future social security benefits very much, so that at age 62 it appears that they are giving 
up benefits by continuing to work.  In any case, most observers would probably agree that a 
major part of the cause of the retirement increase at age 62 has something to do with social 
security, even if the exact precess remains unclear. 
The other variables in the retirement probit behave more or less as expected, to the degree 
to which they are significant.  The two most important variables are poor health and having been 
laid off from the initial job, both of which substantially increase the probability of retirement.  
Tenure (years of service) in the initial job is also highly significant, with higher tenure levels 
appearing to increase the probability of retirement.  Another significant variable is the share that 
the respondent has contributed to lifetime household income (as of 1992); primary earners retire 
later.  The self employed are also likely to retire later.  There is no systematic difference in 
14At the average earnings for the sample, the coefficient on premium value indicates that 
retirement would decrease by 0.072 percentage points, or about 0.036 percentage points per year 
since the average period in this study is two years, for each $1000 increase in premium value.  
This compares with a figure of 0.054 percentage points per year reported by Coile and Gruber 











retirement associated with gender (although primary earners in the family are significantly more 
likely to retire later), or with Black or Hispanic status once the other independent variables are 
included in the retirement equation.  Also note that the planning horizon, which is the closest 
direct measure we have to time preference, is not significant in the retirement equation.  Lastly, 
those who are able to reduce their hours of work without leaving their job are less likely to 
proceed directly from full time work to full retirement, instead either prolonging the length of 
time spent on a job in which the workload can be modified, or partially retiring on such a job.
15 
In the wealth regression, the dependent variable is the ratio of non-pension, non-social 
security wealth to the lifetime household earnings.  This variable may loosely be interpreted as 
the fraction of lifetime household resources that have been saved in addition to pensions and 
social security.  Since many types of wealth, such as household wealth or financial wealth, 
cannot really be separated into parts due to each partner, this variable is necessarily a household 
variable, although the observations are still individuals.  As with the retirement variable, the 
magnitude of the coefficients may be a little deceiving.  A value of 0.01 is associated with an 
increase in household wealth of one percent of the lifetime earnings of both spouses, and this can 
translate into a sizable sum. 
The first coefficient is that of the log of total lifetime family earnings.
16  The sign and 
magnitude of this coefficient suggests that, all other things equal, a doubling in earnings causes 
the wealth ratio to drop by about one percentage point.
17  The next two variables are the ratio of 
effect of social security accruals. 
15See Gustman and Steinmeier (1984) for an analysis of partial retirement both on the 
main job and on other jobs. 
16When a quartic in family lifetime earnings percentiles is added to the wealth equation, 
the coefficients are not individually or jointly significant over and above the log of family 
lifetime earnings, and the remaining coefficients appear to be hardly affected. 
17Because the log of lifetime family lifetime earnings appears in the denominator of the 
dependent variable, there will be some downward bias in the coefficient estimated for lifetime 
earnings due to measurement error.  When we fit the wealth regression including only 
respondents for whom we had social security records, and therefore for which any biases arising 
from errors in measuring lifetime household earnings should be less, the coefficient on total 




   




pension wealth and social security wealth to lifetime household earnings.
18  If there were perfect 
substitution between pension wealth, social security wealth, and other types of wealth, these 
coefficients would by -1, and reductions of other types of wealth would fully offset any pension 
or social security wealth.  If there were no offset, the coefficients would be 0. In contrast to the 
predictions of a simple life cycle model, and consistent with our earlier results with slightly 
different specification, these coefficients suggest that the respondents do not reduce the amounts 
of other types of wealth very much to offset higher levels of pension and social security wealth.
19 
For reasons that are not completely clear, the coefficients on the accrual and premium 
value variables all are positive, although only one of them is significant. Significant coefficients 
on other variables have effects in plausible directions. These variables include the race variables, 
with blacks having five percent less wealth, the education variables, with more educated 
respondents having considerably more wealth (holding lifetime earnings constant), and the 
planning horizon variables, with those with short horizons having less wealth.  The tenure 
variable is also highly significant in increasing wealth.  There is some tendency of older 
respondents to have higher wealth ratios, but the tendency is fairly noisy.  Households with a 
larger age difference between spouses, those in poor health and union workers have lower 
wealth.  Self employment is associated with much higher wealth, suggesting a unique motivation 
for wealth accrual by the self employed. 
opposite direction from the change that would be caused strictly by measurement error in the 
lifetime earnings variable, so that there must be some systematic difference between the 4150 
observations with an attached social security record, and the 1458 observations for families with 
at least one social security record missing.  The coefficients on the other covariates are very 
similar between the two regressions.   
18These ratios are calculated as of 1992, since the social security records provide earnings 
information up through 1991.  For more detailed analysis of the substitution of pensions and 
wealth, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a).   
19We reestimated the wealth equation using median and robust regressions.  Among the 
differences in the significant coefficients, the coefficient on the log of lifetime family earnings 
turned from small and negative (-0.0110) in the OLS equation to small and positive in the robust 
regression (.0053); and the coefficient on pension value over lifetime earnings turned from small 
and negative (-.0548) to small and positive (.0296).  
20  
 




As indicated in Section III, one of the main interests of these regressions is to see whether 
retirement and wealth are correlated, as a model with heterogeneous leisure preferences but 
uniform time preferences would suggest.  Such correlation should be evident in Table 5, which 
lists the results for both the retirement an wealth equations.  To facilitate the comparison, the two 
equations in this table have corresponding observations, except that the wealth equation is 
limited to married respondents.  However, the retirement equation is not much changed when it 
too is limited to married respondents, and a test of the proposition that married and single 
respondents have the same coefficients in the retirement equation is not rejected. 
Correlation, to the extent it exists, should have two implications.  First, the independent 
variables should work in the same direction in the retirement and wealth regressions.
20  While it 
is true that high levels of tenure have strong, positive effects on both retirement and wealth, for 
both the health variable and the self employment variable, the effects are significant in each 
equation but are of opposite signs.
21  Further, there are a number of variables which are 
significant in one equation, but not the other.  Whether a layoff occurred, whether the respondent 
can reduce hours in the job, and the share that the respondent contributes to household resources 
are all significant in the retirement probit, but not in the wealth regression.  On the other hand, 
race, education, the planning horizon, whether the respondent is a management or professional 
worker, and whether he or she is covered by a union are all significant in the wealth regression, 
but not the retirement probit.  Excluding the age dummies, of the 40 independent variables in the 
retirement and wealth equations in Table 5, 23 variables have a significant coefficient in at least 
one of the equations.  Among the variables with significant coefficients in at least one equation, 
nine have the same sign in both equations, and 14 have different signs in both equations.  This 
pattern certainly does not yield the impression that there is a tight correlation between early 
20The omission of the pension and social security wealth variables from the retirement 
probit does not affect these results; when we run the retirement probit adding these variables, 
there is hardly any change in the coefficients. 
21The finding with regard to the health variable is not a surprise.  When a factor reduces 
labor market opportunities, especially when it is not clearly foreseen, and also creates expenses, 
it is reasonable to find earlier retirement accompanied by lower wealth. The perfect foresight 





   
   
 
 




retirement and wealth. 
However, the fit in both the retirement probit and the wealth regression is rather poor, so 
that most of the action is in the unobserved error terms.  This means that a perhaps a more 
important way that retirement and wealth could be correlated is through a correlation in the error 
terms.  When this correlation is calculated for individuals who are in both equations, however, 
the correlation is a mere -0.008.
22  This is in rough agreement with the lack of correlation we 
observe with regard to the effects of the observed explanatory variables.  Both the explanatory 
variables and the error terms seem to be saying that there is not much relation between retirement 
and wealth.  This means that a model with homogeneous leisure preferences and a uniform time 
preference is inconsistent with the observed pattern of retirement and wealth, and that any model 
which is used for structural estimation should probably include heterogeneous time preferences 
or something similar to break the implication of strongly correlated retirement and wealth.
23 
VI.  Separate Pension and Social Security Effects. 
The equations presented in Table 5 assume that the effects of accruals and premium 
values are the same whether they operate through pensions or social security.  Table 6 presents 
partial results of an additional probit estimation for the retirement regression equation which 
splits up the effects of accruals and premium values into separate components for pensions and 
social security.  The results for the probit where these variables are combined are repeated for 
convenience. 
At first glance it would appear that the effects are indeed different.  To be sure, all three 
pension effects are approximately both in magnitude and significance equal to the effects for the 
combined variables.  For the social security variable, the premium value effect is about the same 
in both magnitude and significance as for the pension variable, but the social security variables 
incorporate unexpected events. 
22For the retirement probit, the error term used in the correlation is either 1 or 0, 
depending on whether the respondent actually retired, minus the fitted probability of retirement 
from the estimated probit. 
23Such a model should also include the other major motivations for saving, as outlined in 








   
 
 




for both accrual variables are smaller in magnitude and are not significant.  The effect for the 
initial level of the social security accrual measure is even of an unexpected sign, but the 
magnitude is very small. 
However, the confidence intervals of the final accrual variable for social security clearly 
includes the point estimate of the pension variable, and the same thing is nearly true for the 
initial social security accrual variable.  This raises the possibility that the two sets of estimates 
for the pension and social security variables are not significantly different and invites a test of the 
differences.  Twice the difference in the log likelihoods is 3.12, which is clearly not significant 
when compared to a chi squared distribution with three degrees of freedom.  Recall from Table 3 
that the variability of the social security accrual variables was less than half as much as it is for 
the pension accruals.  Evidently the lower variation in the social security accruals has led to less 
accurate estimates of these effects, so that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects of the 
social security and pension accruals and premium values are the same.
24 
One final note is that the point estimates of the effects of the premium values are the 
same for pensions and social security.  Since the variation in premium values for pensions is 
wider than the variation in social security premium values, especially among the group for whom 
the premium values are positive, it would appear that the overall effect of pension premium 
values on retirement is somewhat larger than the effect of social security premium values.
25 
VII.  Social Security Acceptance Behavior. 
We have assumed to the current point that those who retire accept their social security 
benefits upon retiring, or will accept them at age 62 once they do retire.  In addition, we have 
assumed that those who do not retire at all do not accept their social security benefits until they 
retire.  The top panel of Table 7 indicates that the vast majority of those who are retired do claim 
24On the other hand, when we run a probit with the social security accruals, the likelihood 
ratio that these two coefficients are jointly zero is not rejected. 
25We also estimated wealth equations with separate measures of pension and social 
security accruals.  The findings were similar to the wealth equation reported in Table 5.  The 
only significant coefficient is for the initial accrual created by pensions. 
23  
 
                                                 
 
 
their benefits, with the share of claimants increasing with age between 62 and 65.
26  At age 62, 
69.5 percent of retirees have accepted benefits.  By age 65, the acceptance rate is up to 92 
percent.  The numbers accepting benefits among the partially retired are just slightly lower.  
Among those who are not retired, 11.5 percent claim benefits at age 62, rising to 42.1 percent by 
age 65. 
The second panel of Table 7 shows that benefit acceptance was optimal only for a modest 
fraction of those 62 to 65 who actually accepted them.  Among the completely retired who are 62 
years old, less than a fifth of those who accepted benefits should have.  Among 64 year old 
retirees, only a little more than a third of those accepting benefits should have.  The third panel 
examines who should postpone acceptance, and it includes all individuals in the sample even if 
they are not currently eligible because of the earnings test.  About 90 percent of married males 
and half of married females should postpone benefit receipt, while no single males over 63 or 
single females over 65 should delay.  In the final panel, we see that among those for whom it 
would be optimal to postpone benefit acceptance, the average gains from doing so are close to 
$8,000 per year for both married males and married females at age 62.  The value declines with 
age for married males, but remains over $7,000 for married females, even at ages 64 or 65, due 
to their longer life expectancy. 
Evidence that benefit claiming is being driven by liquidity constraints, and not by the 
reward to postponing benefit receipt, can be seen in the first two rows of Table 8.  Among those 
who are retired, those with a higher ratio of nonpension, nonsocial security wealth to social 
security wealth, are significantly less likely to have accepted benefits.  Moreover, among those 
who have fully retired, those with the strongest incentive to postpone benefit receipt, as 
measured by a higher social security premium, are most likely to accept benefits.  With the 
overwhelming majority of those who have retired claiming benefits, these regressions appear to 
distinguish behavior only among a minority of retirees who are on the margin of claiming 
benefits, and not to tell a clear and consistent story about what is motivating the overwhelming 
majority of retirees to claim their benefits earlier than optimal. 
26These numbers understate the fraction of eligible beneficiaries who accept benefits at 
age 62.  See Olson (1999). 
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To this point we have assumed that even though the older population is failing to 
postpone benefit receipt so as to maximize the present value of expected future benefits, they still 
include the value of delaying a claim to benefits as part of the reward to delayed retirement. One 
way to remove the value of delayed benefit receipt from the reward to delayed retirement is 
somewhat counter intuitive.  That is, we can calculate the social security incentives to retire on 
the assumption that whenever the individual retires, benefits will be claimed at the optimal age.  
To further investigate this issue, we have reestimated the retirement equation, measuring social 
security incentives assuming that benefits are evaluated as if they are claimed at the optimal age.  
When the regression combines the incentive from social security and pensions, the effect of 
computing social security incentives at the optimal retirement age is to drop the coefficient on 
the premium value by one third, from -.022 to -.014.
27  When pension and social security 
incentives are measured separately, the coefficient on the social security premium value is 
reduced from -.024 to -.010, and the t statistic on the social security premium becomes 
insignificant at -1.08.  Accordingly, if increases in social security benefits from delaying benefit 
receipt are not taken into account when deciding on the retirement date, then the size of the 
reward to delaying retirement is reduced, and in addition, the effect of each dollar of reward in 
the form of increased social security benefits on retirement is also reduced, to insignificance.  
VIII.  Sensitivity Analysis. 
There are several additional questions which might be raised about these results, 
particularly the retirement equations.  In this section we will look at some of these issues. 
The first question that might be raised is whether the self-employed respondents are 
driving the results.  Recall that the self-employed have large coefficients, especially in the wealth 
equation, and that the conditions under which they work may make the retirement decision for 
these respondents much different from the other respondents.  The real question is whether the 
retirement equation will look very different if the self employed are excluded. 
This question is examined in the second column of Table 9.  This column estimates the 
27The t-statistic on the measure of the combined premium declines from -2.85 to -2.08.  






probit only for those who are not self employed.  Compare this to the first column, which 
estimates the equation for the entire sample.  The effects of the two accrual variables are 
virtually identical, both for the pension versions of the variables and for the social security 
versions of the variables.  The magnitudes of the premium values for both pensions and social 
security are 20 to 25% lower with the restricted sample, and are no longer significant.  However, 
when the premium value variables are combined, the resulting variable is significant (This result 
is not shown in the table).  There is no evidence in the second column of Table 9 that the 
premium value effect of pensions is any different from the premium value effect of social 
security. 
Another question relates to using some observations where the social security values are 
imputed.  In our analysis we exclude observations where the respondent indicates there is a 
pension, but the pension plan description was not collected from the employer; we do so on the 
grounds that the imputations of pension incentives (accruals and premium values) from the 
respondent information alone is mostly noise.  The same problem is less true of social security, 
since social security operates with a uniform set of rules which are known even if the respondent 
did not give permission to obtain the social security record.  Whether including these imputed 
records has affected the results is an open question, however, since we must still impute the wage 
history if the social security record is missing. 
The third column of Table 9 gives the results of the retirement probit when the sample 
only includes those for whom social security records were actually obtained.  There are some 
differences here, and the standard errors are in general larger, as one would expect given the 
reduction in the sample size.  The two social security accrual variables are still insignificant, but 
the effect of the social security premium value variable is almost twice as large.  With regard to 
the pension variables, the premium value effect and the effect of the final accrual are very close, 
but the effect of the initial accrual is just less than half as great as in the base estimates. 
However, for all six variables the confidence intervals constructed around the estimates 
with the restricted sample include the value estimated from the full sample.  This leads to the 
possibility that the effects between the two estimates are not significantly different.  One can do 
the test by estimating over the two subsamples and comparing the log likelihoods to the full 








statistic of 76.88 for 55 degrees of freedom.  Thus we would conclude that although the point 
estimates are different, particularly for a couple of variables, the differences are not statistically 
significant. 
The next question relates to the definition of retirement.  In Section IV we argued that 
both objective based retirement definitions, such as that based on hours, and self reported 
retirement definitions, contain problems.  We developed a hybrid definition of retirement that 
combines the information in the objective measures with the self reports to give what we feel is a 
more sensible result when the objective measure differs from the self-reported measure.  
However, we would like to know how sensitive the results presented here are to this approach. 
The last two columns of Table 9 suggest the point estimates are not too sensitive to the 
specification of the dependent variable.  The only coefficient that changes substantially is in the 
direction of our apriori expectations.  The coefficient on the final accrual measure for social 
security is positive and almost significant when the dependent variable is defined using only self 
reported status.  The coefficients of the premium variables fall somewhat and are no longer 
significant, but they are still within the confidence intervals of the base estimates. 
IX. Probability of Partial Retirement 
To this point we have examined only the flow from full time work into full retirement.  In 
this section we examine other flows away from full time work, both the flow from full time work 
to any kind of retirement and the flow specifically to partial retirement.  Probit estimates for 
these flows are reported in Table 10, using the same set of explanatory variables as was used in 
Table 5.  The left equation is a probit for leaving full time work for any retirement, either partial 
or full, while the right equation is a probit for leaving full time work for partial retirement only.  
For some variables, the effect in the partial retirement equation is to amplify the effect in the full 
retirement equation in Table 5, while for others the effect in the partial retirement equation 
offsets the effect in the full retirement equation.  Although the pattern of significant coefficients 
is somewhat different for leaving full time work equation in Table 10 as compared to the full 
retirement equation in Table 5, there appears to be no more correspondence between these 
coefficients and the wealth equation than there was for the full retirement equation in Table 5.  









considering retirement as a move from full time work to either partial retirement or full 
retirement. 
The coefficient on earnings in the partial retirement equation is negative and of about the 
same size as the negative coefficient in the equation for full retirement, so that higher earnings 
are twice as effective in slowing the flow from full time work than is suggested by the coefficient 
in the full retirement equation.  Similarly, a higher pension premium reduces the flow into partial 
retirement, in addition to reducing the flow into full retirement.  In contrast, the negative 
coefficient on the measure of initial benefit accrual in the partial retirement equation offsets to 
some degree the positive coefficient in the equation for full retirement, and the result is that 
while a high initial period benefit increment increases the flow to full retirement in the following 
period, the effect on the flow out of full time work is about only about three-quarters as much. 
Notice next that the age effects are significant and in the same direction in the equations 
for partial and full retirement, but they are substantially smaller in the partial retirement equation.  
Among the other independent variables, note that while self employment reduces the flow from 
full time work to complete retirement, it increases the flow into partial retirement by even more.  
Interestingly, those who are free to reduce hours of work on their jobs are two percent less likely 
to move from full time work into full retirement, and are 3.5 percentage points more likely to 
flow into partial retirement.  Having experienced a past layoff raises the likelihood of moving 
into full retirement by 15 percent, and in addition, increases the likelihood of moving from full 
time work into partial retirement by another 4 percent, altogether increasing the likelihood of 
leaving full time work by almost a fifth. 
X.  Conclusions. 
This paper began with a simple theoretical model of the relationship between retirement 
and wealth accumulation.  If the only heterogeneity were in leisure preference, those who retire 
early would be found to accumulate more wealth, enabling them to support themselves in 
retirement.  Moreover, those characteristics that encourage earlier retirement would also 
encourage more saving.  With heterogeneity in both leisure and time preference, this simple 
relation is broken. 






whether the variables have corresponding effects in both equations, as would be predicted by a 
model with only heterogeneous leisure preferences.  We do find some variables which induce 
early retirement and which also induce higher wealth.  However, in many cases the coefficients 
do not have comparable effects in retirement and wealth equations.  Moreover, the unobservables 
from the retirement and wealth equations are only weakly correlated.  This suggests that more 
than heterogeneous leisure preferences is required to explain the observed patterns. 
This finding suggests caution is required when using reduced form equations to evaluate 
new policies.  Reduced form models may be adequate for estimating the impact of changes that 
are common in the period generating the data, but they may be less reliable for other kinds of 
changes.  An example is estimating the impact of raising the early retirement age.  The reduced 
form retirement equation estimated here contains evidence that there is a substantial increase in 
retirement around age 62, at least part of which is probably due to the social security early 
retirement age.  But how much of this increase is due to the early retirement age, and how much 
would be transferred to a later age were the early retirement age increased?  Since the early 
retirement age has not changed in decades, it cannot be directly included in an analysis.  It is 
conceivable to introduce other variables which would measure the effect, but one would still 
have to be wary as long as there was any residual increase in retirement around age 62 in the 
equation. 
The main purpose of this paper, however, is focused on another issue, that of gathering 
evidence to specify a proper structural model to be estimated.  The advantage of estimating 
structural models is that it is possible to investigate the effects of policy changes such as 
increasing the early retirement age even if those changes have not been observed in the data sets 
used to estimate the model.  The evidence suggests that there are more complexities in behavior 
than those created by heterogeneous leisure preferences alone, and that heterogeneity in time 
preference is also probably required to generate the observable relations between retirement and 
wealth. 
Heterogeneity in time preferences could also explain several results which are puzzling in 
reduced form equations.  Individuals with high time preferences may value future income from 
pensions and social security much less than the amounts calculated using the interest rate.  This 





measured pension and social security wealth in conventional saving equations.  Moreover, if 
individuals with high levels of pension and/or social security wealth have lower time 
preferences, as for instance in the sorting mechanism suggested by Ippolito (1998), then any 
substitution between pension and non-pension wealth would be further obscured. 
The failure of most retirees to delay claiming social security benefits suggests that many 
individuals value future benefits less than using the interest rate would suggest.  This raises 
questions about the way social security and pension benefits are calculated as explanatory 
variables in reduced form retirement equations.  In a world with heterogeneous time preferences, 
it may not be appropriate to evaluate payment streams using an interest rate which is constant 
across individuals.  Structural models which allow for the possibility of heterogeneous time 
preferences may allow for a more natural treatment of this problem.  Analyses in which at least 
some respondents poorly understand the benefit schedule, or do not value spouse and survivor 
benefits in accordance with their expected value, may also be appropriate. 
These findings are unsettling for public policy analysis.  Reduced form equations, such as 
the retirement equation or the wealth equation, must be used with great caution in situations 
where they are applied to analyze new policy initiatives.  Unobserved heterogeneity interacts 
with the observable variables to produce the estimated coefficients in these equations, but the 
comparable interactions are not necessarily the same if the policy changes in new ways.  
Structural models which depend on the underlying utility parameters, are less subject to this 
criticism.  But such models are almost certainly more difficult to estimate, and the researcher 











   
   
 
    
     
    
     
     
   
   
 
   
     
    
 
     
   
   
 
   
     
    
     













Effects of Leisure Preferences and Time Preferences 
on Retirement and Wealth 
Effects of Leisure Preference 
Leisure Preference  Low  High 
Retirement Decision  Late  Early 
Level of Wealth  Low  High 
Effects of Time Preference 
Time Preference  Low  High 
Retirement Decision  No Effect  No Effect 
Level of Wealth  High  Low 
Effects of Positively Correlated Leisure and Time Preferences 
Leisure Preference  Low  High 
Retirement Decision  Late  Early 

















Objective vs. Self Reported Retirement 
(Figures are percentages of total) 
Self Reported Retirement Status 
Usual Hours 






Retired  Total 
More than 35  47.6%  2.9  0.4  50.9 
1-35  3.9  3.4  0.8  8.0 
0  5.5  3.2  32.4  41.1









     
 
     
 
     
       
       
     
 
     
       
       
     
     
     
       
         
       
     
 
     
       
        




Accruals and Premium Values 
for Pensions and Social Security 
(Accruals and Premium Values are Expressed 
as Percentages of the Current Earnings) 
Mean  Standard Deviation  Percent Nonzero 
Accruals at the Start of the Period 
Pension  8.5%  27.6%  42.7% 
Social Security  6.1  11.4  78.0 
Combined  14.6  29.8  85.2 
Accruals at the End of the Period 
Pension  6.6  23.1  43.9 
Social Security  5.6  10.8  80.0 
Combined  12.2  25.4  86.6 
Premium  Values 
Pension  10.6  46.1  14.2 
Social  Security  17.9 38.4 61.3 
Combined  22.2  57.1  50.9 
Premium Values (for Respondents with Nonzero Values) 
Pension  74.8  100.9 
Social  Security  29.2 45.6 










     
           
 
         
           
 
           






Derivation of the Sample 
Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4  Total 
Interviews  12652 11316 10653 10119 44740
 Age-Eligible Interviews  9824 8804 8312 7886 34826 
In  Initial  Year
   Working Full Time  6310  4927  3845  3088  18170 
   With Nonmissing Age  6310  4742  3845  3088  17985 
   With Nonmissing Earnings  5343  3962  3211  2527  15043 
   With Nonmissing Spouse  5194  3847  3075  2381  14497 
   With Nonmissing Pension  4072  3069  2523  2008  11672 
In  Next  Survey  Year
   With Interview  3739  2844  2332  0  8915 
   With Nonmissing Work Status  3735  2842  2331  0  8908 





   
   
 
      
        
       
   
   
       
   
   
       
       
   
       
   
       
   
 
Table 5 
Retirement and Wealth Equations 
Full Retirement Probit  Wealth  Regression 
Marginal 
Effect  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  0.2272  3.42 
Measures of earnings: 
Log of annual earnings  -0.0143  -2.48 
   Log of lifetime family earnings  -0.0110  -2.48 
Pension & social security values: 
   Pension value / lifetime earnings  -0.0548  -2.65 
   Social security / lifetime earnings  0.1000  2.57 
Pension & social security incentives: 
Initial accrual / annual earnings  0.0348  3.29  0.0142  2.46 
Final accrual / annual earnings  -0.0656  -3.63  0.0111  1.64 
  Premium value / annual earnings  -0.0216  -2.85  0.0038  1.23 
Age binary variables: 
50  -0.0407  -1.07 
51  0.0114  0.47  -0.0129  -1.33 
52  0.0025  0.12  -0.0076  -0.90 
53  0.0531  2.66  0.0007  0.09 
54  0.0449  2.42  0.0023  0.32 
56  0.0290  1.58  0.0121  1.68 
57  0.0474  2.57  0.0044  0.62 
58  0.0584  3.06  0.0149  2.01 
59  0.1100  5.41  0.0074  0.95 
60  0.1849  8.35  0.0128  1.65 
61  0.2559  10.54  0.0148  1.78 
62  0.2514  8.55  0.0009  0.09 
63  0.3232  8.92  0.0231  1.69 
64  0.3252  6.85  -0.0081  -0.44 
65  0.3110  3.69  0.0699  2.05 
Personal characteristics 
   Female  -0.0026  -0.23  0.0101  1.52 
Married  -0.0318  -2.19 
      Age difference if married  -0.0003  -0.39  -0.0017  -4.83 
Race 
Black  0.0008  0.08  -0.0511  -9.16 
Hispanic  -0.0218  -1.60  -0.0171  -2.49 
Fair or Poor Health  0.1035  8.69  -0.0145  -2.62 
Not available  -0.0575  -0.46 
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Less than high school  0.0149  1.49  -0.0203  -4.13 
      Some college  -0.0125  -1.27  0.0211  4.41 
Undergraduate degree  -0.0032  -0.24  0.0223  3.41 
Graduate work  -0.0058  -0.43  0.0366  5.61 
Children  0.0102  0.69  0.0029  0.28 
Planning horizon 
Next year  0.0048  0.56  -0.0204  -4.63 
More than ten years  0.0077  0.56  0.0084  1.27 
Not available  0.0245  1.09  0.0096  0.93 
   Word recall (number of words)  0.0000  -0.01  0.0006  0.84 
Not available  -0.0172  -0.80  -0.0227  -2.15 
   Share of lifetime household earnings  -0.0773  -3.82  0.0100  0.98 
Job Characteristics 
   Self employed  -0.0298  -2.26  0.1072  16.65 
Not available  0.8905  11.82  0.1409  1.02 
Years of service  0.0016  4.54  0.0012  7.07 
Not available  0.2678  2.43  0.0141  0.30 
Industry: 
Manufacturing  0.0124  1.08  -0.0038  -0.72 
      Public administration  0.0170  1.06  -0.0061  -0.81 
Occupation: 
      Management or professional  0.0016  0.14  0.0128  2.52 
      White collar  -0.0025  -0.27  0.0064  1.39 
Covered by union  0.0133  1.45  -0.0106  -2.36 
Not available  0.1045  0.85  -0.0197  -0.31 
Covered by pension  0.0224  2.23  -0.0075  -1.50 
Not available  -0.1186  -31.42  -0.0926  -0.62 
   Firm with more than 100 employees  0.0174  1.57  -0.0010  -0.18 
Not available  0.0309  1.80  -0.0127  -1.56 
Availability of reduced hours  -0.0231  -2.16  0.0071  1.27 
   Laid off from initial job  0.1497 8.00  -0.0080 -0.96 
Pseudo R
2 or Adjusted R
2  0.1024  0.146 
Number of Observations  8612  5608 
Note: The probit estimates are the marginal effects on the probability of retirement of a one unit 






     
         
     
       
     
       
     
       




Comparison of Pension and Social Security Effects 
in the Retirement Probit 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Pension  Social  Security  Combined 
Initial Accrual / Annual Earnings  0.0402  -0.0077  0.0348 
(3.59)  (-0.22)  (3.29) 
Final Accrual / Annual Earnings  -0.0679  -0.0378  -0.0656 
(-3.42)  (-0.88)  (-3.63) 
Premium Value / Annual Earnings  -0.0202  -0.0242  -0.0216 
(-2.17)  (-2.11)  (-2.85)






    
         
      
        
 
        
 
        
 
    
 
Table 7 
Social Security Benefit Acceptance* 
Age 
62  63  64  65 
Current Retirement Status:  Actual Benefit Acceptance Rates 
Not Retired  11.5%  22.5%  20.4%  42.1% 
Partially Retired  65.3  77.4  79.8  89.8 
   Completely Retired  69.5  83.8  88.7  91.8 
Current Retirement Status: 
Percentage of Actual Acceptors for 
  Whom Acceptance Was Optimal 
Not Retired  3.9%  9.1%  9.1%  36.3% 
Partially Retired  13.2  23.9  23.1  63.8 
   Completely Retired  16.6  29.0  37.7  65.7 
Demographic Group: 
Percentage of All Pontential Recipients 
Who Should Delay Benefit Acceptance 
Married Males  91.9%  91.0%  87.2%  38.1% 
Single Males  93.6  0  0  0 
   Married Females  55.9  51.1  44.4  40.5 
   Single Females  83.8  83.3  60.2  0 
Demographic Group: 
Average Present Value of Delay 
Among Those Who Would Gain From Delay 
Married Males  $7,991  $5,496  $2,684  $1,806 
Single Males  293  - - -
   Married Females  7,786  7,260  7,161  7,220 
   Single Females  1,778  654  92  -
Notes: 
1. 	Social Security receipt refers to the previous year in 1992, the previous month in 1994, and 
current receipt in 1996 and 1998. 
2. 	Social Security receipt excludes respondents who currently or previously received SSDI 
disability or SSI before age 65. 
*These numbers understate the fraction of eligible beneficiaries who accept benefits at age 62.   






   
 
           
   
   
                
   
   
   
   
   
                 
                 
   
                
   
   
   
           
               
   
   
   
   




Probits for Social Security Acceptance by Retirement Status 

Retirement Status 
Completely Retired  Partly Retired  Not Retired 
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Liquidity constraint measure (see note)  -0.0492  -2.91  -0.0708  -1.74  0.0136  0.4 
Social security premium ($1,000's)  0.0110  6.26  0.0050  1.55  -0.0030  -0.88 
A g e
 63  0.1052  8.33  0.0760  2.67  0.1461  4.67 
64 
0.1330  10.26  0.1297  4.29  0.1628  4.21 
65 
0.1699  12.78  0.1658  5.33  0.3972  7.69 
66 
0.1649  11.27  0.1777  5.42  0.6266  9.27 
67 
0.1468  7.14  0.1760  3.32  0.6207  5.42 
Female  -0.0048  -0.32  0.0133  0.33  0.0395  1.16 
Married  -0.0179 -1.12  -0.0725 -1.5  -0.1184 -2.56
   Age difference if married  -0.0014  -0.98  -0.0036  -1.19  -0.0002  -0.07 
Race
 Black  -0.0940  -5.32  -0.0821  -1.95  -0.0623  -1.94 
Hispanic 
-0.1101  -4.86  -0.1296  -2.01  -0.1303  -3.22 
Fair or poor health  -0.0374  -2.89  -0.0090  -0.24  0.1380  3.93 
Not available 
-0.1979  -0.96 
Education
 Less than high school  0.0059  0.4  -0.0256  -0.69  0.0625  1.94 
   Some college  0.0005  0.03  -0.0996  -2.63  -0.0437  -1.42 
Undergraduate degree 
-0.0690  -2.72  -0.1519  -3.15  -0.0508  -1.26 
Graduate work 
-0.1367  -4.94  -0.1779  -3.71  -0.1310  -3.76 
Children  -0.0154  -0.71  0.2268  3.16  0.0837  1.83 
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 Not available  0.0256  0.23 
Planning  Horizon
 Next year  -0.0126  -0.97  0.0291  1  0.0906  3.2 
More than ten years 
-0.0166  -0.75  -0.0275  -0.59  0.0796  1.63 
Not available 
-0.0119  -0.46  -0.1266  -1.58  0.0718  1.16 
Word recall (number of words)  0.0061  2.62  0.0074  1.52  -0.0047  -0.99 
Not available 
-0.0049  -0.17  0.0646  1.07  -0.0382  -0.67 
Share of lifetime household earnings  0.0671 4.15  0.0157 0.23  -0.2573  -4.51 
Pseudo R
2  0.110  0.116  0.185 
Number of observations  4236  1031  1446 
Notes: 
1.  The probit estimates are the marginal effects on the probability of retirement of a one unit change in the explanatory variable. 
2.  The liquidity constraint measure is the ratio of non-pension, non-social security wealth to social security wealth. 
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 Initial Accrual / Annual Earnings  0.0402  0.0430  0.0198  0.0355  0.0441 
(3.59) (3.67) (1.24) (3.47) (3.71)
 Final Accrual / Annual Earnings  -0.0679  -0.0626  -0.0512  -0.0634  -0.0704 
(-3.42)  (-3.06)  (-2.38)  (-3.40)  (-3.33)
   Premium Value / Annual Earnings  -0.0202  -0.0163  -0.0215  -0.0147  -0.0134 
(-2.17) (-1.67) (-1.89) (-1.71) (-1.42) 
Social  Security
 Initial Accrual / Annual Earnings  -0.0077  0.0056  -0.0029  -0.0197  -0.0171 
(-0.22)  (0.15)  (-0.07)  (-0.63)  (-0.46)
 Final Accrual / Annual Earnings  -0.0378  -0.0393  -0.0081  0.0451  -0.0303 
(-0.88)  (-0.80)  (-0.18)  (1.92)  (-0.71)
   Premium Value / Annual Earnings  -0.0242  -0.0180  -0.0460  -0.0147  -0.0078 
(-2.11)  (-1.48)  (-2.81)  (-1.37)  (-0.72) 







     
         
 
 
         
 


































Probits for Leaving Full-Time Work and for Partial Retirement 
Leaving Full-Time Work  Partial  Retirement 
Marginal 
Effect  t-statistic 
Marginal 
Effect  t-statistic 
Measures of earnings: 
Log of annual earnings  -0.0349  -4.90  -0.0160  -4.09 
Pension & social security incentives: 
Initial accrual / annual earnings  0.0271  1.82  -0.0272  -1.98 
Final accrual / annual earnings  -0.0671  -3.20  0.0029  0.25 
  Premium value / annual earnings  -0.0283  -3.05  -0.0068  -1.18 
Age binary variables: 
51  0.0316  1.05  0.0228  1.16 
52  0.0061  0.23  0.0040  0.24 
53  0.0557  2.31  0.0029  0.19 
54  0.0750  3.30  0.0325  2.15 
56  0.0765  3.35  0.0473  3.03 
57  0.1137  4.96  0.0678  4.23 
58  0.1220  5.18  0.0692  4.19 
59  0.1679  6.91  0.0605  3.66 
60  0.2987  11.58  0.1276  6.79 
61  0.3780  13.79  0.1449  7.20 
62  0.3508  10.55  0.1273  5.35 
63  0.4574  11.36  0.1830  6.05 
64  0.5336  10.12  0.2880  6.88 
65  0.4224  4.30  0.1385  2.10 
Personal  characteristics
   Female  -0.0170  -1.21  -0.0135  -1.58 
Married  -0.0196  -1.09  0.0087  0.83 
      Age difference if married  -0.0015  -1.39  -0.0010  -1.58 
Race 
Black  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.00 
Hispanic  -0.0241  1.36  0.0028  0.25 
Fair or Poor Health  0.1061  7.27  -0.0035  -0.42 
Education 
Less than high school  0.0001  0.00  -0.0141  -1.92 
      Some college  -0.0066  -0.52  0.0040  0.54 
Undergraduate degree  -0.0060  -0.35  -0.0041  -0.41 
Graduate work  -0.0023  -0.14  0.0031  0.30 
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 Children  0.0053  0.28  -0.0056  -0.47 
Planning horizon 
Next year  -0.0009  -0.09  -0.0054  -0.83 
More than ten years  0.0220  1.27  0.0116  1.13 
Not available  -0.0390  -1.48  -0.0473  -3.60 
   Word recall (number of words)  0.0011  0.64  0.0011  1.10 
Not available  0.0039  0.13  0.0277  1.39 
   Share of lifetime household earnings  -0.0926  -3.59  -0.0128  -0.84 
Job  Characteristics
   Self employed  0.0184  1.08  0.0390  3.68 
Not available  0.8118  0.9371  22.77 
Years of service  0.0019  4.30  0.0002  0.57 
Not available  0.3881  3.00  0.1012  1.37 
Industry: 
Manufacturing  -0.0071  -0.49  -0.0201  -2.31 
      Public administration  0.0408  1.96  0.0220  1.65 
Occupation: 
      Management or professional  0.0171  1.23  0.0152  1.81 
      White collar  0.0094  0.79  0.0123  1.71 
Covered by union  0.0299  2.47  0.0141  1.79 
Not available  0.0347  0.24  -0.0688  23.09 
Covered by pension  -0.0049  -0.38  -0.0266  -3.39 
Not available  -0.2030  -12.94  -0.0636  23.49 
   Firm with more than 100 employees  0.0055  0.39  -0.0097  1.19 
Not available  0.0318  1.55  0.0016  0.15 
Availability of reduced hours  0.0134  0.95  0.0354  3.99 
   Laid off from initial job  0.1980 8.67  0.0413 3.07 
Pseudo R
2  0.1011  0.0778 
Number of Observations  8612  8612 
Note: The probit estimates are the marginal effects on the probability of retirement of a one unit 
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46 
 
  Variable Definitions 
  lnearn       Log of 1992 earnings (amounts < $100 disregarded) 
         wealth  Non-pension, non-social security wealth as of 1992 
  ssvalue      Household social security wealth, assuming spouse works to expected retirement age 
  penvalue   Pension value as of 1992 
  sppenval   Spouse pension value as of 1992 
  totwlth        The wealth variable plus pension and social security values. 
  wrat  Ratio of wealth to family lifetime earnings    
  saccpt  Dummy variable for acceptance of social security benefits. 
    Note:  variable is defined differently in different surveys. 
         liqrat  Ratio of non-pension, non-social security wealth to social security wealth, limited to being 
between 0 and 1 
  premval    Current amount of social security premium value 
 
Note:  If the following four variables are preceded by a "p", the variable refers to pension values only.  If preceded 
by a "s", they refer to social security values only.  If followed by a "c" the social security values are calculated 
  assuming respondents collect benefits as soon as possible.  If followed by a "m", they are calculated assuming that 
respondents wait until the optimal date to register for benefits. 
 
  accrat   Ratio of accrual to earnings in initial survey year.  Accrual is the benefits if the respondent retires 
in the following year vs. the benefits if the resondent retires in the current initial survey year. 
  excrat     Excess value / earnings further divided by the number of years until the excess value is realized. 
  facrat  Ratio of accrual to earnings in the final survey year. 
  fexrat     Similar to excrat, but measured in the final year. 
  daccrat    Difference in accrual rates in final minus initial year. 
Personal characteristics: 
  age          Age in years at the time of the initial survey 
         female    Binary variable for respondent being female 
  mar          Binary variable for being married in the initial year 
          white    Binary variable for respondent being white 
  black        Binary variable for respondent being black 
  hisp           Binary variable for respondent being hispanic 
  health  Binary variable for fair/poor health in initial year 
  hsdrop    Binary variable for high school dropout 
  hs    Binary variable for high school graduate 
        somecol  Binary variable for some college, but no degree 
  coll  Binary variable for bachelor's degree 
  gradsch  Binary variable for graduate school attendance 
  child  Binary variable for at least one child 
  childdk      Binary variable for unknown child status (family respondent not interviewed) 
  homeownr   Binary variable for home ownership in initial year 
  hmowndk    Binary variable for unknown home ownership status 
  planhr1      Binary variable: Planning horizon next year or less 
  planhr2      Binary variable: Planning horizon 2/10 years 
  planhr3      Binary variable: Planning horizon 10+ years 
  plnhrdk      Binary variable: Planning horizon unavailable 
        recall    Number of words recalled in second attempt 
  recalldk   Binary variabel for unknown recall status 
  expret  Age of expected retirement 
  expretnv   Binary variable: Expects to never retire (expret = 0) 
  expretdk     Binary variable for unknown expected age of retirement  
  spwrk45  Binary variable if spouse has worked since age 45 
  respwshr    Fraction of combined lifetime earnings attributable to responedent 
 
Job Characteristics (for job in initial year): 
       selfempl    Binary variable for self employment 
  sempldk      Binary variable for unknown self employment status 
  tenure  Number of years of service in job 
  tenurdk      Binary variable for unknown tenure    
  mfg          Binary variable for manufacturing 
           publ  Binary variable for government job 
  mgmtpf       Binary variable for management or professional job 
  whitec         Binary variable for white collar job 
bluec        Binary variable for blue collar job 
union       Binary variable for union job 
uniondk      Binary variable for unknown union status 
  pension      Binary variable for job with pension 
  pensdk  Binary variable for unknown pension status 
          lrgfm  Binary variable for firms with > 100 employees 
  lrgfmdk      Binary variable for unknown firm size 
  redhours  Binary variable if respondent can reduce hours 
  layoff         Binary variable for layoff from initial year job */ 
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